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Abstract: Since Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party, he has been tightening ideological control 
across many fronts. This article investigates how the framing of tele-
vised confessions facilitates Xi’s rule. Originating from the intra-Party 
disciplinary technique of self-criticism, the recent resurgence of medi-
ated confessions reflects Xi’s pursued strategy in tackling social and 
political challenges. Applying critical discourse analysis to the case of 
the disappeared Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, this paper shows the 
way in which the framing of Gui’s televised confession follows Xi’s 
so-called rule of law agenda and selectively appeals to traditional Chi-
nese family values. The paper argues that the propaganda value of the 
televised confession from a little-known, non-Party confessant lies in 
its banality, which blends into the Party’s everyday narration. The 
resurgence of confessions might suggest a regression towards Maoist-
style campaigns, but more audience-oriented research is needed to 
address this issue fully. 
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Since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) in 2012, he has been amassing huge personal 
power and tightening ideological control across many fronts (Minzner 
2015; Shirk 2018). Meanwhile, there has been a considerable debate 
on the degree to which Xi can be called the “new Mao” (Buckley 
2017; Phillips 2017; Brown and Van Nieuwenhuizen 2016; Zhao 
2016; Lam 2012). Some have observed a recent rise in the number of 
television confessions (Minzner 2018; Fiskesjö 2017). Confession, or 
self-criticism, has been an intra-Party disciplinary technique since the 
early days of the CCP. It gradually evolved into a mass mobilisation 
tool and spread beyond the Party during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1976) (Dittmer 1973). The technocratic reform era saw the 
political use of self-criticism fade out of ordinary people’s daily lives. 
The recent appearance of such confessions on TV, especially those 
featuring non-Party members, shows that the CCP regards this tech-
nique as being very useful in tackling the challenges that it is facing 
today.  
Xi’s era has witnessed dozens of TV confessions, involving people 
from all walks of life. There were journalists who confessed to having 
produced false reports, public intellectuals who admitted having 
spread rumours, celebrities who took drugs, and ethnic minorities 
who committed murder and took part in looting in Xinjiang (Yoon 
2015; Mitchell 2014). However, TV confessions have received only 
limited academic attention to date. Through the ongoing case of Gui 
Minhai, this article thus provides an in-depth examination of the 
official ideological framing in operation here. 
Gui was born in Ningbo, southeast China, but is currently a 
Swedish citizen who does not hold Chinese citizenship. Before his 
disappearance, he made a living from selling books in Hong Kong. 
Some of his works are “thinly-sourced, tabloid-style political books 
[…] which are outlawed in mainland China” (Holmes and Phillips 
2015: paragraph 22). He was one of the five Hong Kong Causeway 
Bay booksellers who were kidnapped by mainland authorities due to, 
as widely speculated, their book businesses. Gui’s case is unique due 
to his multiple identities and connections with mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Sweden. His case can be viewed as a prism, refracting the 
multiple relations that the framing needs to construct and coordinate 
simultaneously. Yet Gui’s case also captures a series of traits that are 
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shared across TV confessions (Safeguard Defenders 2018). TV con-
fessions are politically motivated, yet they are often framed as any-
thing but politically relevant (more on this later).  
Taken together, Gui’s confession is a synthesis of various identi-
ties, relations, and discourses. However, by no means does Gui’s case 
encompass all the traits of TV confessions. Nor can it produce a 
generalised conclusion about TV confessions on its own. This article 
only aims to dissect the working mechanism of language in the pro-
duction of ideology, taking the first step towards the examination of 
scores of TV confessions that have appeared on the country’s screens 
since 2012. 
By applying Fairclough’s three-dimensional critical discourse 
analysis (CDA), this paper identifies two prominent discourses: the 
“rule of law” discourse and the “family values” discourse. It is worth 
noting that the rule of law discourse in this article is shorthand for 
“socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics,” which is the offi-
cial translation of Xi’s definition of “ruling the country according to 
law.” It underlines the indispensable and leading role of the CCP in 
building the legal system in China, and distinguishes itself from any 
other forms of rule of law (Li 2018: 3). The analysis begins with lin-
guistically determining two of Gui’s identities. It then examines the 
way in which the production of the TV confession induces the pre-
ferred interpretation. In particular, the analysis is interested in the role 
of narrator and the strategic omission of certain information. Lastly, 
the analysis looks at the factor of resonance in China today. It inves-
tigates the specific cultural resonance that the confession appeals to. 
The result indicates that Gui is constructed linguistically as a 
criminal and an unfilial son. The narration actively guides the inter-
pretation of Gui as a law-breaking and morally degraded person. The 
framing conforms to Xi’s latest emphasis on the socialist rule of law 
with Chinese characteristics and the traditional family value of filial 
piety – with the modern twist of the “one-child policy” (1979–2015). 
The paper highlights the strategic use of “traditional culture” and 
“virtues” in framing, and draws attention to the banal but potentially 
beguiling nature of TV confessions. The confession functions as a 
constructed portrayal of consent among the confessant, the public, 
and the Party, maintaining superficial conformity to the status quo. 
This study is important for two reasons. First, it provides a 
glimpse into the intricate process by which Xi’s ideological predilec-
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tions come into operation. There is a dialectic relationship between 
language and society: both actively shape, and are shaped by, each 
other (Fairclough 2001). It is obvious that certain people, thoughts, 
and terminologies have come to appear more frequently today in 
official documents and rhetoric. However, do they work exactly as 
the Party had hoped? The dialectical relationship between language 
and society means that through a close examination of discourse, the 
study is able to show the specific context that gives rise to the dis-
courses, and how these in turn shape the context according to the 
Party’s own expectations.  
Second, understanding TV confessions and the timing of their 
resurgence can establish a more nuanced understanding of Chinese 
“tradition.” Such tradition – seemingly constant and everlasting – is 
often far from a mere set of fixed neutral practices. Its pervasiveness 
and taken-for-granted nature mean that it is potentially more subtle 
but effective method than blasting out political slogans to get the 
message across. Consequently, it is harder to detect or resist – and 
thus deserves more attention. 
The article is structured as follows. It first reviews the historical 
background to the Party-led confession and the critical application of 
framing theory within the Chinese media system. It then explains the 
rationale for using CDA, and proceeds to the detailed analysis of 
Gui’s TV confession. The article concludes with a discussion as to 
the implications of the discourses identified. 
6HOIFULWLFLVP&RQIHVVLRQDQGWKH&&3
The recent phenomenon of a person apologising for his or her 
wrongdoing on TV is known as “televised confession” (⭥㿶ᗿᛄ, 
dianshi chanhui or ⭥㿶䙬׋ , dianshi bigong). Confession is neither 
uniquely Chinese nor an invention of Xi’s era. It has, indeed, a long 
history in religious practice both within and outside China (Wu 1979; 
Tentler 1977). Over the years it has taken many forms, such as auto-
biographies, psychoanalytical therapies, legal confessions, governance 
strategies, and political show trials (Hu 2012; Taylor 2009; Payne 
2008; Foucault 1998). The media has also revamped confession, blur-
ring the public–private boundary, altering its function, and transform-
ing its power (Burkart 2010). However, mediated confessions in Chi-
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na have received comparatively little attention from academics. This 
study aims, then, to bridge this research gap. 
Recent TV confessions can be traced back to the practice of criti-
cism and self-criticism, and Soviet-style show trials (Fiskesjö 2017; 
Hu 2012; Lu 2004). Self-criticism, together with criticism, is a tool to 
discipline erring cadres. The essence of such practice is a hierarchical 
order in which the powerful demand that the weak show submission 
through both physical and psychological pressure. It was originally 
designed to prevent disagreement within the Party from reaching a 
tipping point (Dittmer 1973). This intra-Party mediating mechanism 
usually included a temporary alienation of the cadre who was under 
investigation through a collective criticism session. This cadre had to 
not only accept the criticism but also conduct self-criticism. Normal-
ly, the cadre remoulded his or her thoughts and behaviours during 
the process, and thus was reintegrated to the group (Schurmann 
1959). The above process, as Dittmer (1974) argues, was Liu Shaoqi’s 
model of criticism and self-criticism. Originating from the Nationalist 
enemy-controlled area where Liu had overseen underground CCP 
activities in the 1920s and 1930s, his model was concise, structured, 
clandestine, and reason-oriented. 
Liu’s model is lesser known compared with Mao Zedong’s 
Yan’an one, which prioritised the correct substance in criticism. If the 
criticism did not support the Party leadership, it was antagonistic. The 
purpose thus was not so much to amend past errors but to show 
submission, demonstrate loyalty, to educate, and to intimidate the 
disobedient (Rowe 2014). 
It was Mao’s model that gradually spread beyond the CCP to the 
grass-roots level. After 1949, the Party no longer faced an immediate 
threat to its survival. Its monopoly over mass communication facili-
ties paved the way for the appearance of mediated self-criticism. That 
of provincial and central Party leaders could be found in the People’s 
Daily in the early 1950s. Within a decade, the confessants spread to 
high-profile members from the eight minority parties recognised by 
the CCP. During the Cultural Revolution, mass media became an 
essential tool in popularising self-criticism among the masses 
(Dittmer 1973). The self-criticism of local cadres, factory workers, 
and village leaders appeared also in the People’s Daily. With the death 
of Mao, the practice reverted to an intra-Party disciplinary measure 
and mostly faded out of public view (Minzner 2018). 
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The two models, and especially Mao’s, were representations of a 
strict hierarchical order. Criticism was always initiated by powerful, 
high-ranking leaders against cadres of lesser rank, or the masses. Ac-
cordingly, self-criticism was expected from weaker subordinates (Hu 
2012; Apter and Saich 1994). Those who listened to the confession 
commanded enormous power because they were deemed knowledge-
able and ideologically pure enough to judge the sincerity of the self-
criticism. Even in the case of the Cultural Revolution, where the 
masses criticised Party officials, this occurred because they were incit-
ed to do so by Mao – the most powerful leader – and due to the Party 
officials conducting self-criticism being no longer in power. As such 
criticism is a political tool of the dominant to exercise their authority, 
while self-criticism or confession is the manifestation of the weak 
submitting to it. 
Xi’s first five-year term witnessed a resurgence of mediated con-
fessions, yet the existing literature focuses mostly on the Mao-era 
ones (Sun 2013; Hu 2012; Dittmer 1973). Fiskesjö, a friend of Gui, is 
one of the few scholars to have directed their attention to the recent 
TV confessions. From the perspective of Soviet show trials and 
“clean torture,” he argues that TV confessions – as a form of staged 
conformity – show the domination and gross violation of human 
rights (Fiskesjö 2017). I agree with most of his argumentation, but 
nevertheless do not view TV confessions as a media spectacle on the 
same scale as show trials. Instead, I argue that the framing of the TV 
confession bears greater resemblance to ordinary crime news. In early 
2018, the human rights group Safeguard Defenders published a pion-
eering report which summarises the characteristics of recent TV con-
fessions. Selective as it may be, the report reveals the coercive 
measures behind these seemingly voluntary acts undertaken between 
2013 and 2018.  
Interviews with 45 confessants show that they were pressured, 
threatened, or even tortured into conducting these TV confessions. 
The confessants revealed that they were either told exactly what to 
say or given general scripts for the confession. It turns out that the 
directors of TV confessions are security agents, rather than staff from 
China Central Television (CCTV). The report highlights the purpose 
of TV confessions as three “Ds”: “deny,” “denounce,” “defend” 
(Gardner 2018; Safeguard Defenders 2018). Deny means that the 
confession often includes lines rebutting criticism directed towards 
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the Party. Denounce denotes that the confessant is ordered to attack 
certain people, organisations, or even a nation in their confessions. 
The last task for the confessant is to defend. Not only does the con-
fessant have to reject the criticism levelled against the Party: he or she 
has to praise the government, the police, the legal system, or even the 
crackdown on him/herself. This paper later demonstrates that the 
three Ds are also present in Gui’s confession. Next, I examine media 
framing theory in the context of China’s contemporary official media. 
7KH$SSOLFDWLRQRI0HGLD)UDPLQJ7KHRU\LQ
;L¶V&KLQD
Framing theory has been in wide application across a number of dif-
ferent academic disciplines (Hallahan 1999; Lemert and Branaman 
1997; Schön and Rein 1994; Ryan 1991; Gitlin 1980; Tannen 1979; 
van Dijk 1977). Its application in the media is particularly useful in 
this study (Entman 1993a; D’Angelo 2002; de Vreese 2012). Frames 
in the media are “the characteristics of the news text” (Entman 1991: 
7). Through selection and reutilisation, certain aspects of media con-
tent are made more salient and persistent than others (Entman 
1993b; Gitlin 1980). Therefore, media framing is a selective construc-
tion of events where certain characteristics of texts or themes out-
weigh others. Metaphors, historical examples, catchphrases, depic-
tions, and visual images often indicate the location of frames in media 
texts (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Together they identify, diag-
nose, suggest solutions to, and make moral claims on the topic in 
question. The success of framing depends on the relatively constant 
social cultural background – or “cultural resonance” – that is specific 
to a society at a particular moment (Ferree 2003). 
Media framing theory is applied to this study here in a critical 
manner. Since the theory has been developed on the basis of cases 
predominantly from Western democracies, it has some default as-
sumptions as to journalistic professional norms, checks and balances 
in political systems, and responsibilities of business corporations. For 
example: journalists often have the duty to keep powerful institutions 
in check; the media is supposed to be a contested public sphere 
where various participants voice different opinions; and, meanwhile, 
the business interests of big media organisations can be at odds with 
their expected media responsibilities. There are important differences 
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between authoritarian political environments and their liberal demo-
cratic counterparts in terms of the ways in which relationships be-
tween political elites, the media, business corporations, and ordinary 
people intertwine. 
The application of media framing theory in this study closely re-
lates to the role of the official media in China, which has always been 
at the forefront of constructing common beliefs so as to facilitate the 
Party’s rule. Guiding the official media has been, mostly, the “Party 
Principle”: that the media is to serve the Party (Zhao 1998). Since 
1949, the Party’s management of the media has followed its political 
control over society. The media enjoyed much freedom in the early 
days of the People Republic of China before plunging into the “Dark 
Ages” (Lu 2004: 164) of Mao’s continuous ideologically oriented 
political and economic campaigns. Journalism became an instrument 
for political propaganda and indoctrination. Deng Xiaoping’s eco-
nomic reforms restored some freedom in the mid-1980s when liberal-
democratic media ideals entered China. However, the aftermath of 
the 1989 student movement saw a return to the rigid model of media-
as-mouthpiece. Only in 1992 did new reform opportunities arrive 
when Deng’s Southern Tour put economic reform back on track. 
The media, together with many other industries in China, had to 
commercialise to survive. It ultimately formed a hybrid structure 
which is under the influence of both the Party and the market 
(Stockmann 2012; Zhao 2008). 
Despite economic reform and the freedom that it has brought, 
the core of the official media today is still the Party Principle. Rank-
ing China 176 out of 180 in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index, 
the non-governmental organisation Reporters without Borders de-
scribes President Xi as “the instigator of policies aimed at complete 
hegemony over news coverage” (Reporters Without Borders 2017). 
During Xi’s visit to CCTV in February 2016, a slogan prominently 
displayed on a large screen behind the president declared that the 
media must be “surnamed Party” (Rudolph 2016).  
Journalistic norms and the institutional practices of the official 
media are both strictly under the guidance of the Party. Commerciali-
sation and technological advancement have challenged the CCP’s 
monopoly on information, and encouraged people’s participation in 
media production. However, the Party Principle remains the official 
media standard. Economic reform certainly brought changes to it, 
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but not in terms of what roles the media plays – only how it plays 
them. 
0HWKRGRORJ\
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Discourses, including linguistic, visual, and audio elements, both re-
flect and shape social orders (Jaworski and Coupland 2014). Changes 
in the use of language can be a sign of social shifts, which ultimately 
link to changing power relations (Fairclough 1993). This study applies 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA to investigate how the TV con-
fession is framed in order to maintain the CCP’s rule. Together with 
many other schools within CDA, it concerns the mechanisms of lan-
guage, power, and ideology. It explores the role of language in politi-
cal struggle, inequality, and domination (Breeze 2011). Such analysis 
can demonstrate the relationship between discourses and social orders 
through three steps. It begins by unpacking the textual linguistic fea-
tures of the item under study. It then interprets the effects of the 
production and consumption of the discourse. Finally, it explains the 
social, cultural, and political environments that give rise to the dis-
course (Fairclough 2003, 2001, 1993). 
There are three main reasons to choose CDA. First, it provides a 
normative and explanatory critique of discourse, evaluating it against 
what ought to be right (Fairclough 2017). Considering the overtly 
political nature of the official media in China, my choosing of CDA is 
only to state the obvious – namely, to reveal that the official media 
are reinforcing, rather than challenging, existing power relations. 
However, this is not to deny the complexity of the internal conflicting 
interests within the Party (McGregor 2010). At least in the case of TV 
confessions, the official media are active participants herein (Safe-
guard Defenders 2018). Regardless of which debates occur behind 
the scenes, the result is to deploy a “trial by media.”  
Second, as the result of normative claims, the explanatory inter-
pretation follows what the CCP has always admitted – the aforemen-
tioned Party Principle. CDA has been criticised for the tendency to 
adopt ideologically motivated interpretations (Widdowson 2005, 
1998; Stubbs 1997; Toolan 1997). The interpretation offered in this 
article is neither random nor mere personal preference. The CCP has 
never been shy about its control over society through the media, as 
  26 Yuanyuan Liu 

the Party Principle demonstrates. Therefore, it is reasonable to read 
the official framing in line with the current political advocacy of the 
Party. Lastly, CDA complements framing theory in that the latter 
focuses on the patterned and explicit features of a text whereas the 
former also takes into consideration what is purposefully left unsaid. 
What is left out of the picture is as important as what is carefully 
presented, if not more so. 
7KH&DVHRI*XL0LQKDL
Gui disappeared from his house in Thailand in late 2015. He abruptly 
appeared on CCTV news in early 2016, claiming to have handed him-
self in for a drink-driving accident which had occurred over a decade 
ago. It attracted much attention and raised many questions abroad. 
Broadcast on 17 January during the TV programme Oriental Horizon, 
the 10-and-a-half-minute-long news feature recounts an emotional 
tragedy. According to the story, Gui handed himself in to mainland 
police due to his guilty conscience for being a criminal at large and an 
irresponsible son. Gui confesses to drink-driving, killing a female 
university student and then escaping abroad during probation. His 
claim is backed up by a traffic policeman’s recollection of the case 
and the victim’s mother mourning of her only daughter. Meanwhile, 
Gui describes the restless life of illegal immigration abroad. The pass-
ing of his father and his mother being sick prompted him to return to 
China to face legal punishment and his moral duties. In tears, he ex-
presses the regret of breaking up the victim’s family and the failure to 
fulfil his filial duty to his own parents.  
However, there are multiple discrepancies throughout the story. 
Small details such as the different Chinese characters in Gui’s name 
and the different T-shirts he wears make Gui’s confession look less 
voluntary. Escaping during probation was also an illogical choice. It 
contradicts a 2005 news report of the accident, which described Gui 
as being “willing to assume ‘full responsibility’ in the form of eco-
nomic compensation” (Bandurski 2016: paragraph 12). These incon-
sistencies further question the authenticity of the confession. More-
over, what is unsaid is his real “crime” – publishing books about the 
private lives of top Chinese political leaders. 
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CDA shows that there are two prominent discourses here. The fol-
lowing section lays out how Gui’s two identities – which correspond 
to the respective discourses – are linguistically framed. It then shows 
the role of the narrator and of strategic omission in directing the 
interpretation of the confession. Lastly, the analysis explores the cul-
tural resonance that has given rise to this framing.  
5XOHRI/DZ'LVFRXUVH
Gui’s most prominent identity in the story is “criminal.” His criminal 
status is both explicitly expressed and implicitly advocated. The news 
feature is explicitly framed as a crime story: Gui, a hit-and-run driver 
who lived abroad for years after fleeing, has now handed himself in. 
Gui is rarely directly called a criminal, but there are plenty of incrim-
inating references. The traffic policeman mentions Gui as the “driver 
who caused the accident” (㚷һਨᵪ, zhaoshi siji); the narrator de-
scribes Gui’s years abroad as the “life of a fugitive” (䘳ӑ⭏⏟, tao-
wang shengya). Even Gui is heard speaking of himself as a “criminal 
fugitive” (䘳⣟, taofan). He describes his feeling of guilt as follows: 
Excerpt One 
Gui:  
[…] After leaving the country, I had hoped that my mental pres-
sure would’ve been alleviated. However, the pressure wasn’t re-
duced. Actually, it became worse, as the feeling of guilt and shame 
grew day by day. On the one hand, I […] ran away from my re-
sponsibility, which […] further hurt the feelings of the victim’s 
family. On the other hand, I left China illegally. Not only did I es-
cape my original punishment, but also broke Chinese law again 
[…] that was one more crime […] and so […] a sense of guilt and 
shame […] made me suffer long-term mental unrest. (Oriental 
Horizon 2016) 
Gui’s own account of shame and regret, together with the incriminat-
ing lexicon choices, underlines the typical restlessness of a fugitive, 
signalling explicitly his identification as a criminal. Gui’s criminal 
status is also alluded to by the fact that he has “victims,” indicating 
that he has brought harm to others. At the end of the news feature, 
the narrator adds that Gui is under investigation for “being involved 
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in other criminal activities” – suggesting that he is prone to reoffend-
ing. The details utilise and reflect the presupposed social and cultural 
norms surrounding the fear of crime (Chang 1990). By emphasising 
Gui’s guilty nature both directly and indirectly, the details set the 
theme of the rule of law.  
On the interpretive level, the production of the TV confession 
interdiscursively affects the subsequent interpretation of it. Packaged 
as a news feature, Gui’s confession is merged seamlessly with the 
third-person narration. In particular, this narration plays a crucial role 
in guiding the interpretation of the story by following the checklist of 
the aforementioned three Ds: deny, denounce, defend. To deny the 
abduction accusation directed at the Chinese government, the female 
presenter begins the programme with “There have been many reports 
about Gui’s so-called disappearance in foreign and Hong Kong media 
recently” (Oriental Horizon 2016). The “so-called disappearance” in-
sinuates that Gui did not vanish for no reason. The news concludes 
with the following extract, echoing the previous so-called disappear-
ance remark: 
Excerpt Two 
Narrator: 
Gui Minhai said the moment when he had decided to return to 
China and hand himself in, he was also ready to take the legal re-
sponsibility for all his actions. Gui handed himself in to mainland 
police in October 2015. However, to his surprise, some people 
with ulterior motives sensationalised his decision.  
Gui Minhai: 
It was my voluntary choice to come back and hand myself in. It 
had nothing to do with anyone else. I don’t wish any individuals 
or organisations, including the Swedish authorities, to be involved 
in or interfere with my returning to China. Although I hold Swe-
dish nationality, I really feel that I am still Chinese. My roots are 
still in China. […] Therefore, I hope the Swedish authorities re-
spect my personal […] choice, respect my privacy, and right to 
make this decision. Let me myself solve the problem. (Oriental 
Horizon 2016) 
In the example, the narrator guides the interpretation of the text by 
speaking on behalf of Gui. The narrator leads the audience to believe 
that Gui was genuinely “surprised” that the Swedish authorities and 
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foreign media were looking for him. Such framing makes Gui indi-
rectly denounce the Swedish authorities and foreign media as “people 
with ulterior motives” who “sensationalised” his disappearance. Em-
phasising the voluntary nature of his reappearance in China, Gui 
defends his captors and their actions. By summarising the account of 
the events and fulfilling the three Ds task, the narration ensures that 
the confessant’s words can only be understood in certain – unam-
biguous – ways. 
Moreover, the brand of the programme Oriental Horizon can 
boost the confession’s credibility. Debuting in 1993, the show was 
China’s “first large-scale news magazine programme” (Hong, Lü, and 
Zou 2009: 42). Its brand has been built on covering pressing domes-
tic social issues with professional journalistic language, in contrast to 
the usual empty political preaching. The programme itself wields 
respect among its audience, thus making the narration more persua-
sive.  
On the social level, framing Gui’s story within the rule of law 
discourse appeals to the institutionalised resonance of establishing a 
system of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics. Since the 
late 1970s, China’s top leaders have tried to avoid the “rule of man,” 
especially the kind that characterised Mao’s late years (Brown and 
Bērziŀa-þerenkova 2018). Much effort has been put into building the 
legal framework and raising general legal awareness. Between 1949 
and 1978, there were a mere 134 laws passed (111 of them later being 
deemed invalid), among which only one was passed during the Cul-
tural Revolution (in 1975). In the two decades after 1976, the Nation-
al People’s Congress and its Standing Committee passed over 337 
laws (Pei 2001).  
Meanwhile, the numbers of law firms and lawyers rose from 
1,456 and 5,500 in 1981 to over 8,300 and 110,000 by 1998 (Peeren-
boom 1998). The Party has also been raising legal awareness and 
cultivating an ethos of respect towards law-based rules among the 
general public. The law-promulgating institutes began publicising 
laws; this practice has become an integral part of the Five-Year Plan 
(Peerenboom 2002). The official media produced more law-related 
programmes. CCTV initiated its legal channel in 2002: CCTV-12 
Society and Law (changing its name to National History on 1 January 
2019). The official website declares its mission as being “to imple-
ment the state policies of ‘rule of law’ and ‘rule of virtue’ to achieve 
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the goal of building a ‘harmonious society’” (CCTV12 2018). Many 
other CCTV channels also broadcast legal programmes, such as Legal 
Report (1999–present) on CCTV-1. The result is the creation of a 
basic legal structure and a broad familiarity with the law among the 
general public. Thus, it is fair to conclude that China has moved away 
from the kind of prevalent lawlessness that characterised the Cultural 
Revolution – and so the rule of law has become common Party ver-
nacular (Chen 2016; Minzner 2011; Peerenboom 2002).  
Xi also claims to prioritise the rule of law in his political agenda. 
The year 2012 was the 30th anniversary of the 1982 Constitution, and 
Xi declared that China “must firmly establish throughout society, the 
authority of the constitution and the law” (Bandurski 2018: paragraph 
7). Two years later, at the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Com-
mittee, rule of law became the core topic of the plenum for the first 
time (Peerenboom 2015). The plenum issued the important docu-
ment “CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major 
Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country Ac-
cording to the Law Forward” (Decision 2014), signalling potential 
further reform in the legal arena. The official rhetoric continues by 
showcasing Xi’s commitment to the rule of law. 
However, law remains a tool for the Party when it deems it ne-
cessary (Radin 1989; Peerenboom 2002; Zhang 2017). As mentioned 
before, Xi clearly rejects the notion that law should “impose mean-
ingful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling 
elite” (Peerenboom 2002: 2). “Decision 2014” unapologetically under-
lines the leading role of the Party in the implementation of the social-
ist rule of law with Chinese characteristics (Zhang 2017; Peerenboom 
2015; Pils 2015), thus legitimising the use of public naming and sham-
ing to discipline Gui. Moreover, Minzner (2018, 2011) argues that – 
since entering the twenty-first century – legal reform in China has 
been in regression. DeLisle (2015) also predicts that law will assume a 
more repressive role in dealing with political changes. In the name of 
maintaining social stability, the Party has installed a top-down policy 
which encourages the court to mediate any disputes rather than to 
follow legal norms. Apart from TV confessions, Xi’s flagship anti-
corruption campaign has been largely carried out through extra-legal 
investigation (Peerenboom 2015). Most recently, the crackdown on 
human rights lawyers and the abuse of Uyghurs in re-education 
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camps in Xinjiang are two very telling examples that, in areas such as 
social stability, the Party rules over the law.  
As the analysis has shown, the lexical choice in the confession 
frames Gui directly and indirectly as a criminal who lives up to the 
image of a dangerous, guilt-ridden fugitive at large. Gui’s confession 
is weaved into the narration of the story; consequently, the subse-
quent interpretation is at the mercy of the narration. Gui’s criminal 
identity corresponds to the CCP’s efforts to install a Party-led rule of 
law system ever since the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, 
“a criminal” is not the only image that the framing of Gui constructs. 
The following section explains Gui’s second identity: “unfilial son.” 
)DPLO\9DOXHV'LVFRXUVH
Filial piety is a Confucian virtue regarding the responsibility to care 
for and please one’s ageing parents. It is, indeed, one of the most 
important virtues among traditional Chinese family values (Chan and 
Tan 2004). From this perspective, Gui is an unfilial son – as he ad-
mitted that his fugitive status meant he could not take care of his frail 
parents:  
Excerpt Three 
Gui: 
[…] However, I was a criminal at large, so I couldn’t go back to 
China and visit my […] my parents were in their eighties (swallow-
ing hard twice). In 2015, my dad died of cancer (sobbing). I 
couldn’t attend the funeral (crying). After this, my mother fell 
gravely ill, so (swallowing) […] I missed her day and night. I want-
ed to (crying) […] see her once more while she was alive (crying). 
[…] Therefore, I must go back to the country and hand in myself. 
I will shoulder my responsibility. I […] am also willing to receive 
[…] any punishments (Oriental Horizon 2016). 
Modalities and verbs can facilitate the formation of the content, and 
indicate the intention of the text (Fairclough 2001; Halliday 1994). 
When Gui is recounting the passing of his father in tears, he says that 
he “must” return to China and “will” face all the responsibilities. The 
two modalities indicate a high degree of certainty of language, show-
ing the determination of a repenting son. As to verbs, Halliday (1994, 
1985) believes that they can indicate a sense of being, an action and a 
feeling, distinguished respectively as “relational,” “material,” and 
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“mental” verbs. A series of action verbs, such as “go” (back to the 
country), “hand in” (myself), “shoulder” (responsibility), and “re-
ceive” (punishments), indicate Gui’s intention to take action. 
The tragic consequence of Gui being the unfilial son is also 
clearly presented in the emotional story of the victim’s family. Details 
about Gui’s victim are scarce; it is apparent only that she was a female 
university student surnamed Shen, in her early twenties at the time of 
the accident. Her father was so grief-stricken that he became ill and 
suicidal. Her death means that her parents have to go through baifaren 
song heifaren (ⲭਁӪ䘱唁ਁӪ, literally, “a person with grey hair bids 
farewell to a person with black hair”) at her funeral. It describes the 
tragedy that one experiences with the death of one’s child – one of 
the three most tragic scenarios in traditional Chinese culture, along-
side losing one’s mother at an early age and losing one’s wife mid-life. 
According to the narrator, her parents had hoped that she would 
soon chengjia liye: ᡀᇦ・ъ, “start a family and a career.” This lexicon 
choice is unusual. Despite the somewhat improved social status of 
women in China, the four-word idiom is conventionally associated 
with the male heir in a family. Sons are expected to form their fam-
ilies and start their careers, whereas daughters are expected to marry 
into other people’s families and focus on domestic affairs (Zhang 
2018). Using the term reveals the effort to frame the status of the 
daughter in this family: she was as important as a son. Consequently 
the loss of the daughter is equivalent to the loss of a son, which 
marks the end of the family line from the traditional Chinese perspec-
tive. 
On the interpretative level, what is left outside the frame is as 
important as what is included in it. Gui describes himself as “guilty,” 
“full of shame,” and “tortured mentally for a long time” (Oriental 
Horizon 2016). He claims to be homeless because of the mental unrest 
after leaving China, amplifying the image of an unfilial son who has 
not been around his parents. However, it ignores his other possible 
family roles. For example, Gui is also a husband and father who has a 
wife and a daughter living outside China (Siu and Lam 2016). This 
omission presupposes that Gui’s home has always been in China 
where he is the son. What is unsaid becomes non-existent, so that 
Gui’s “fugitive life” abroad could only be one of solitude and root-
lessness. 
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On the social level, the framing of Gui as a genuinely repentant 
son aims to resonate with the most ingrained and important social 
relationship in China – kinship (Fei, Hamilton, and Wang 1992). The 
latter has been perpetuated through legal measures as well as moral 
pressure. Xi’s era has witnessed the spread of family values such as 
filial piety to the public and legal domains. On 1 July 2013, the re-
vised “Protection of the Rights and Interests of Elderly People” came 
into effect. Its 18th article demands that “family members living apart 
from the elderly shall frequently visit or greet the elderly” (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress 2012). People were 
astonished at the moral decline that visiting one’s parents had de-
scended from a virtue to the realm of law. Despite the fact that this 
regulation exists more on paper than in practice, the government’s 
message is clear. For years, the government has warned everyone 
against a morally degraded materialistic society which has fatally 
eroded traditional social virtues. Meanwhile, there has been an indi-
vidual-centred moral turn (Yan 2011). The Party vows to uphold this 
virtue by codifying it into national law.  
Compared with legal measures, social pressure and moral judge-
ment are still the more prevalent weapons used. Through the re-con-
textualisation of starting a family/career rhetoric from the son to the 
daughter, Gui is framed as a bad person who not only neglects his 
filial duty but also deprives the parents of another family of being 
taken care of by their only daughter. This exemplifies another chal-
lenging yet here omitted social issue: the shidu (ཡ⤜) family. This 
refers to parents who, under the one-child policy, lose their only child 
and are unable to have another (Fong 2016). According to official 
estimates, there had been over one million such families by 2010 – 
and the number is still rising (Wu and Dang 2013). Losing one’s child 
is universally tragic, but what makes it worse in China is the child’s 
indispensable role in caring for the ageing parents (Han 2017; Hes-
keth, Lu, and Zhu 2005). According to the most recent population 
census (2010), there are around 177 million people aged over 60 years 
old in China (Ma et al. 2010). Social security and medical insurance 
are supposed to cover city residents, but are only available to 40 mil-
lion people. The rural population is neither fully covered nor enjoys 
the same standard of service (Yi 2013). The lack of care facilities and 
medical expenditure means that most of the elderly have only their 
children to turn to.  
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However, shidu families do not even have children to turn to. 
The government had promised to take care of the parents when 
promoting the one-child policy in the early 1980s (Bao 2013). Slogans 
such as “Family planning is very good. Government helps raise the 
old” (Wang 2018) provide a glimpse of the picture here. However, in 
reality, there is a huge gap between the needs of shidu families and the 
local implementation of the relevant policy stipulations (Han 2017). 
Therefore, when facing the grieving parents of Gui’s victim, assigning 
blame solely to the culprit distracts the audience from questioning the 
government’s own responsibilities. Consequently, the framing under-
lines the moral condemnation of Gui – which eventually comes to 
outweigh the legal consequences. The framing thus constructs Gui’s 
causing death by drink-driving as less serious than the “real” crime 
here – breaking up a family and forcing the parents to experience the 
death of their only child, with all the aforementioned ramifications of 
that.  
By advocating filial culture, the framing shifts the responsibility 
of retirement care completely onto the younger generation – who are 
likely to be the only children to their parents, and who are themselves 
facing the mounting pressures of simultaneously working and child-
rearing. Their failure to take care of their own parents can now have 
legal consequences. However, in the era of the revival of classic tradi-
tion and Confucian culture (Minzner 2018), moral stigmatisation is 
more detrimental to one’s reputation. It generates a deep sense of 
guilt in adult children, as demonstrated in Gui’s tears when remem-
bering his absence while his parents were ageing. 
'LVFXVVLRQ
Having examined these two discourses, this section now reflects on 
two implications that arise from the analysis: the contradictions be-
tween the two identified discourses and the banality of Gui’s confes-
sion.  
0RUDO7UDGLWLRQ9HUVXV/HJDO6\VWHP"
The two main discourses in Gui’s case show that the dominant power 
in society is defining what norms are the legally and morally correct 
ones. Nonetheless, there are noticeable contradictions between the 
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two discourses. The final words from Gui in the confession (Except 
Two, rule of law) capture nicely such conflict.  
Gui has been forced to claim that his return to China is volun-
tary, and identifies himself more as Chinese. This leads him to request 
the Swedish authorities to skip the relevant legal proceedings, even 
though they are a legally guaranteed right of foreign nationals in Chi-
na. Despite the emphasis on the rule of law, Gui’s self-identification 
as Chinese (having been born and raised in China, having Chinese 
parents, citing Chinese classics, etc.) overrides his legal status (a Swe-
dish passport holder). After re-contextualising the family values dis-
course to the national level, the filial duty of a Chinese son to his 
motherland triumphs over law and order. Meanwhile, Gui asks the 
Swedish authorities to “respect” his “personal rights” – which, ironi-
cally, are protected by the law that he has just been made to under-
mine. The battle between the discourses rightly captures as well as 
reinforces the current Party-centred legal structure and the definition 
of what it means to be Chinese. What we witness here is a selective 
application of legal regulations and interpretation of Chinese culture – 
both undertaken so as to alleviate the pressure on the Party under Xi, 
in the face of many thorny issues.  
%DQDO&ULPH1HZV
CCP propaganda is usually pompous and overbearing. However, 
there is plenty of subtle persuasion inundating society too. Gui’s con-
fession, like many other TV ones, takes the form of crime news 
(Yoon 2015; Gardner 2018). As mentioned earlier, there are numer-
ous TV programmes designed to familiarise the public with the 
concept of law. Gui’s confession is camouflaged nicely among them. 
From people’s existing ideological foundations, Gui’s confession 
churns out the familiar – even clichéd – traffic accident tragedy, mor-
ally failed fugitive, irresponsible son, and eventual triumph of justice. 
In turn, the confession reinforces associated stereotypes and norms.  
Therefore, I argue that the propaganda value of the TV confes-
sions of those who are neither Party members nor well-known figures 
lies in this very banality. For the domestic audience, Gui’s confession 
is not a show-trial type of media spectacle. Kellner’s definition of a 
media spectacle highlights its popular nature: they often “disrupt 
ordinary and habitual flows of information” (Kellner 2016: 3). Gui’s 
case is hardly “disruptively” popular among its domestic audience. 
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However, banality does not mean harmlessness (Arendt 1964; Billig 
1995). Such TV confessions can quietly function as a way to prime 
people for a society whose cultural and political norms are 
increasingly at the mercy of Xi’s ideology. The periodic injection of 
such mundane confession news insidiously develops emotional and 
expectations-related immunity to governance failures.  
&RQFOXVLRQ,PSOLFDWLRQVDQG&RQWULEXWLRQV
Through the case of Gui Minhai, this paper has examined the recent 
resurgence of mediated confession. Transformed from an intra-Party 
disciplinary technique to a mass campaign during the Cultural Revo-
lution, mediated confession today has evolved into a tool that helps 
consolidate the Party’s rule. While CDA cannot offer generalised 
observations, it can provide an in-depth explanation of the framing of 
the confessant Gui’s two identities: a criminal and an unfilial son. It 
also links these to the wider political agenda of bolstering the socialist 
rule of law with Chinese characteristics and the promotion of tradi-
tional family values. The findings of the study demonstrate that Gui’s 
TV confession captures in microcosm the Party’s logic in promoting 
certain social, cultural, and political norms. Further academic research 
on other TV confessions will deepen our understanding of the gen-
eral characteristics of framing as a propaganda strategy. 
In an ideal world, when someone agrees to go on TV to confess 
this person is giving approval to this being a legitimate method of 
self-criticism and showing submission to the authority who demands 
it. However, it is extremely likely that Gui’s confession was orches-
trated and forced (Safeguard Defenders 2018; Fiskesjö 2017). Rough-
ly a month after Gui’s confession, on 17 January 2016, Hong Kong’s 
Phoenix TV broadcast another televised confession that involved Gui 
and his colleagues apologising for trading “unauthorised” books in 
mainland China (Phoenix TV 2016). Meanwhile, tensions have been 
high between China and Sweden not only over Gui’s confession but 
also another Swedish activist Peter Dahlin’s similar experience and 
eventual deportation. Gui was said to have lived under surveillance 
outside official custody after the confession. However, on 20 January 
2018, Gui was taken away from two Swedish consular staff who were 
accompanying him on a train to Beijing, where he was headed for 
medical reasons. Three weeks later, Gui appeared in a third TV con-
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fession and expressed the “shame” he felt for “leaking national se-
crets” and being “tricked” by the Swedish authorities into attempting 
to escape abroad again. Gui was seen claiming that “Sweden used me 
as a pawn against China” (South China Morning Post 2018). In this way, 
TV confessions are by no means a genuine form of consent.  
However, it is clear that they can strategically and conveniently 
mould both cultural norms and legal regulations as part of justifying 
the Party’s actions. This has a crucial practical implication: “tradition-
al culture” has been dubbed as the “root” or the “soul” of the nation, 
increasingly so after 1989 (Perry 2017). In facing declining political 
trust in the past two decades (Wang and You 2016), the CCP needs 
to restore its credibility by making it difficult for everyone to think 
critically. Compared with Maoist-style propaganda, the current official 
persuasion – adorned with that traditional culture as well as “law and 
order” – is much subtler and potentially more effective. As Gui’s TV 
confession shows, the framing distracts the audience from govern-
ance failure and shifts the blame onto individuals instead. Meanwhile, 
it reproduces the moral panic of an ever-more economically polarised 
society. Ironically, traditional culture and law and order conveniently 
become the excuses for the Party to justify its own immoral and il-
legal behaviour in dealing with domestic conflicts. 
Apart from the practical implications of its research, this article 
also contributes to a new understanding of the propaganda value of 
TV confessions. For those who were aware of Gui’s abduction, the 
TV confession is chilling intimidation, showcasing the capability of 
the Party to coerce someone – both physically and mentally – into 
destroying themself. However, for those who are oblivious to the 
deceptive nature of TV confessions, Gui’s case is just another one 
among the many triumphant “justice has long arms” cases on TV 
which have been regularly broadcast to increase the awareness of the 
law among the general public. Therefore, instead of viewing the TV 
confession as a political – show-trial-style – media spectacle, I argue 
that it resembles more ordinary crime news. Its domestic propaganda 
value lies precisely in its banality, which blends into the Party’s every-
day narrative of what the world looks like, who the Chinese should 
be, and how they should behave. 
The resurgence of mediated confession may be an indication of 
regression to the Maoist form of social control. The method of gen-
erating fear through actual disciplinary actions coupled with mediated 
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confession is similar to practices of the Maoist era. Both Mao and Xi 
have relied on confession to create mental pressure, to enforce their 
rule (Minzner 2018). However, this study here has been unable to 
address the issue of the audience’s reception of TV confessions. It 
seems that Xi has not resorted to the mass campaigns which charac-
terised Mao’s own movements; watching TV is arguably a form of 
passive mass participation, though (Meyrowitz 1985; Anderson 1983). 
Has Xi only borrowed Mao’s name and strategy partially to appear as 
a stronger, firmer, and more legitimate leader than he really is? An 
audience-oriented study is evidently urgently needed to understand 
better the effects of TV confessions.  
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